

















GLOBAL INTEGRATION OF INDIA’S MONEY MARKET: 




























INDIAN COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Core-6A, 4th Floor, India Habitat Centre, Lodi Road, New Delhi-110 003 






GLOBAL INTEGRATION OF INDIA’S MONEY MARKET: 





















The views expressed in  the ICRIER  Working  Paper Series  are those  of the  author(s) and  do  not 




FOREWORD  I 
1  INTRODUCTION  1 
2  LITERATURE REVIEW  2 
3  MODEL AND ESTIMATION  4 
3.1  Estimating Equations  4 
3.2  Econometrics  6 
3.3  Data  Sources  7 
4  RESULTS  9 
4.1  Stationarity and Co-integration  9 
4.2  Covered Interest Parity  10 
4.3  Un-covered Interest Parity  11 
4.4  Exchange Risk and RBI Intervention  12 
5  CONCLUSIONS  13 
6  REFERENCES  15 
7  APPENDIX: TESTS  17 
7.1  Order of integration  17 
7.1.1  Sequential ADF Test for unit root  17 
7.1.2  Phillips-Perron Test  18 
7.2  Test for Co-integration: Johansen’s Methodology  18 
7.3  Call Money Assymmetry  19 
 
TABLES 
Table 1 : Unit Root Test Results................................................................................................ 9 
Table 2: Results of Johansen’s Co-integration Test................................................................ 10 
 
FIGURE 
Figure 1: 3-Month Forward Premium (F) and India-US Interest Differential (Idiff)  8 
 
     i 
Foreword 
 
Financial  openness  exists  when  residents  of  one  country  are  able  to  trade 
assets with residents of another country, i.e. when financial assets are traded goods. A 
weak definition of complete financial openness, which one might refer to as financial 
integration,  can  be  given  as  a  situation  in  which  the  law  of  one  price  holds  for 
financial assets- i.e. domestic and foreign residents trade identical assets at the same 
price. A strong definition would add to this the restriction that identically defined 
assets e.g. a six-month Treasury bill, issued in different political jurisdictions and 
denominated in different currencies are perfect substitutes in all private portfolios. 
The  degree  of  financial  integration  has  important  macroeconomic  implications  in 
terms  of  the  effectiveness  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  in  influencing  aggregate 
demand as well as the scope for promoting investment in an economy. 
 
The paper shows that the short-term (up to 3 month) money markets in India 
are getting progressively integrated with those in the USA even though the degree of 
integration is far from perfect.  Covered interest parity is found to hold for while 
uncovered  interest  parity  fails  to  hold.    The  difference  between  the  two  can  be 
attributed to the existence of an exchange risk premium over and above the expected 
depreciation of the currency.  Analysis of RBI interventions in response to foreign 
exchange shocks suggests that these may play a role in the deviations from interest 
parity.  Further work needs to be done however on this as well as on instruments of 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Financial  openness  exists  when  residents  of  one  country  are  able  to  trade 
assets with residents of another country, i.e. when financial assets are traded goods. A 
weak definition of complete financial openness, which one might refer to as financial 
integration,  can  be  given  as  a  situation  in  which  the  law  of  one  price  holds  for 
financial assets- i.e. domestic and foreign residents trade identical assets at the same 
price. A strong definition would add to this the restriction that identically defined 
assets e.g. a six-month Treasury bill, issued in different political jurisdictions and 
denominated in different currencies are perfect substitutes in all private portfolios. 
The  degree  of  financial  integration  has  important  macroeconomic  implications  in 
terms  of  the  effectiveness  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  in  influencing  aggregate 
demand as well as the scope for promoting investment in an economy. 
The free and unrestricted flow of capital in and out of countries and the ever-
increasing integration of world capital markets can be attributed to the process of 
Globalization. The benefits of such integration are liquidity enhancement on one hand 
and  risk  diversification  on  the  other,  both  of  which  are  instrumental  in  making 
markets more efficient and also facilitate smooth transfers of funds between lenders 
and borrowers.  India began a very gradual and selective opening of the domestic 
capital  markets  to  foreign  residents,  including  non-resident  Indians  (NRIs),  in  the 
eighties.  The capital market opening picked up pace during the nineties.  In this paper 
we try and estimate the degree of financial integration between India and the rest of 
the World, by focussing on the degree of integration of the Indian money market with 
global markets. 
Frenkel (1992) in his review of Capital Mobility measurement outlined four 
different definitions of perfect capital mobility that are in widespread use, of which 
three are of relevance to the current paper.  These are real interest parity, uncovered 
interest parity and covered interest parity.  (i) Real interest parity hypothesis states 
that  international  capital  flows  equalise  real  interest  rates  across  countries.    (ii) 
Uncovered interest parity states that  capital flows equalise expected rates of return on 
countries’ bonds regardless of exposure to exchange risk.  (iii) Covered interest parity 
states that capital flows equalise interest rates across countries when contracted in the 
same currency.  Frenkel (1992) shows that these three definitions are in ascending 
order  of  specificity  in  the  following  sense.    Only  definition  (iii)  that  the  covered     2 
interest differential is zero is an unalloyed criterion for “capital mobility” in the sense 
of the degree of financial market integration across national boundaries.  Condition 
(ii) that the uncovered interest differential is zero requires that (iii) hold and that there 
be zero exchange risk premium. Condition (i) that the real interest differential be zero 
requires condition (ii) and in addition that expected real depreciation is zero.  
2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The  uncovered  interest  parity  (UIP)  theory  states  that  differences  between 
interest rates across countries can be explained by expected changes in currencies. 
Empirically, the UIP theory is usually rejected assuming rational expectations, and 
explanations for this rejection include that expectations are irrational, see Frankel and 
Froot (1990) and Mark and Wu (1998), or that time-varying risk premia are present, 
see Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) and Nieuwland et al. (1998), respectively. In a 
survey of 75 published estimates, Froot and Thaler (1990) report few cases where the 
sign  of  the  coefficient  on  interest  rate  differentials  in  exchange  rate  prediction 
equations is consistent with the un-biased-ness hypothesis and not a single case where 
it exceeds the theoretical value of unity. This resounding unanimity on the failure of 
the  predictive  power  of  interest  differentials  is  virtually  unique  in  the  empirical 
literature in economics. 
A third explanation was provided by McCallum (1994a), who observes that 
regressing the change in spot exchange rates on the forward premium, one typically 
finds a negative regression parameter of -4 to -3 contrary to the expected parameter of 
+1. McCallum argues, however, that  this  finding may  be consistent with the  UIP 
theory, if one introduces policy behavior. Assuming policymakers adjust interest rates 
in  order  to  keep  exchange  rates  stable,  and  that  they  are  interested  in  smoothing 
interest  rate  movements,  McCallum  derives  a  reduced  form  equation  for  the  spot 
exchange rate under rational expectations. In fact, this results in a negative theoretical 
relationship between the change in the spot exchange rate and the forward premium 
consistent with his empirical findings. Christensen, M. (2000) extend the data set used 
by McCallum to include the recent 8 years and find that $/DM, $/£ and $/Yen for the 
period 1978.01m to 1999.03m behave amazingly well according to the modified UIP 
theory  developed  by  McCallum.  However,  when  he  estimates  the  policy  reaction 
function,  its  structural  parameters  are  inconsistent  with  the  UIP  relationships 
estimated.     3 
Nevertheless, there appears to be overwhelming empirical evidence against 
UIRP, at least at frequencies less than one year (see Hodrick (1987), Engel (1996) and 
Froot  and  Thaler  (1990)).  Fama  (1984)  focuses  on  statistical  properties  of  this 
relation. He finds that from the end of August 1973 to the end of 1982, the variance of 
the exchange risk premium has been large, exceeding the variance of expected future 
spot  rates  changes  of  the  dollar  against  each  of  ten  other  major  currencies  (over 
monthly  intervals).  On  the  other  hand  Frankel  and  Froot  (1987),  among  others, 
propose  an  explanation  of  UIP  deviations  based  on  the  existence  of  asymmetries 
between currencies. Using survey data to approximate the exchange rates’ behaviour, 
they show that agents were expecting a 10% depreciation of the Dollar against the 
Mark over 1981-85 whereas the differential in corresponding interest rates was only 
around 4%. Given that this empirical evidence has not stopped theorists from relying 
on UIRP, it is fortunate that recent evidence is more favourable. Bekaert and Hodrick 
(2001) and Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) argue that doubtful statistical inference may 
have contributed to the strong rejections of UIRP at higher frequencies. Chinn and 
Meredith (2001) marshal evidence  that UIRP holds much  better  at long horizons. 
They test this hypothesis using interest rates on longer-maturity bonds for the U.S., 
Germany, Japan and Canada. The results of these long horizon regressions are much 
more positive — the coefficients on interest differentials are of the correct sign, and 
most are closer to the predicted value of unity than to zero. Ravi Bansal
 and Magnus 
Dahlquist  (2000)  conclude  that  the  often  found  negative  correlation  between  the 
expected currency depreciation and interest rate differential is, contrary to popular 
belief, not a pervasive phenomenon. It is confined to developed economies, and here 
only to states where the U.S. interest rate exceeds foreign interest rates 
The covered interest parity (CIP) postulates that interest rates denominated in 
different currencies are equal once you cover yourself against foreign exchange risk. 
Unlike  the UIP,  there is  empirical evidence  supporting CIP hypothesis. Empirical 
studies such as Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977, 1981), Frankel (1989), among others, 
find that the CIP holds in most cases on the Eurocurrency market (where remunerated 
assets have similar default and political risk characteristics) since the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods regime in early 1970’s. Lewis(1995) shows that risk premia do not 
vary significantly and often switch sign, contrary to what the observed stability of the 
countries’ global creditor or debtor status would predict. However she explains that 
not only the conditional variance of exchange rate is not significant enough to account     4 
for risk premia movements, but also that risk premia examined in the short run should 
concern capital flows and investors with similar temporal horizons, such as currency 
traders,  hedge  funds  and  mutual  funds  managers.  Frankel  (1991)  reports  mean 
covered interest differentials (CIDs) for the period 1982 to 1987 for a selection of 
developed  and  developing  economies  using  monthly  observations  of  the  3-month 
local money market rate against the equivalent Eurodollar rate. Focusing on the East 
Asian economies in the sample – Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore – the 
null  of  a  zero  differential  is  rejected  for  the  first  three  economies,  though  only 
marginally in that the CIDs are very low. Chinn and Frankel (1992) found that the 
CIDs were small for Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, but large for Malaysia.  
In the Indian context, Varma (1997) has undertaken an analysis of the covered 
interest  parity.    His  posits  a  structural  break  in  the  money  market  in  India  in 
September 1995, with CIP become effective from that point on for the first time in the 
Indian money market. The structural break itself is attributed to interplay between the 
money market and the foreign exchange market. The period after 1995 is however 
witness to several deviations from the CIP. Varma has used rates on Treasury bills, 
certificates of deposit and commercial paper and call money rate to analyse the Indian 
money market. For the foreign rate he has calculated an implicit euro-rupee rate for 
six, three and overnight maturity.  Thus he uses a mix of actual and constructed rates 
of  different  maturity.    A  rigorous  test  requires  use  of  interest  rates  on  identical 
instruments (e.g. maturity,  risk) and a consistent forward rate (period of forwards 
should be identical to that of instruments).  This is perhaps the first time that such a 
test is being carried out for India.   
3  MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
3.1  Estimating Equations 
One of the key implications  of international financial integration is  on the 
degree of movement/co-movement of interest rates in countries over time and their 
comparison in terms  of convergence or  having a  common  trend.  The  relationship 
between two countries’ interest rates is termed as interest rate parity.  
The interest rate theory proposes that given perfect capital mobility, perfect 
capital market and fixed exchange rates the interest on identical assets (identical in 
terms of maturity etc) would be equal across countries. However, in the real world     5 
with  capital  controls,  flexible  exchange  rates  and  imperfect  capital  markets 
divergence between interest rate is frequently observed and persist over long periods. 
Given the reality of non-frictionless capital markets and flexible exchange rates the 
recent  versions  of  the  interest  parity  theorem  attribute  this  divergence  to  the 
expectation  about  exchange  rate  movements.  Based  on  the  preference  individuals 
have for risk there are two versions of this basic relation: 
 
a)   Uncovered Interest Rate Parity- Assume that individuals are risk neutral. With 
no capital controls and perfect capital markets the interest differential between 
two countries is equal to change in exchange rate:  
 
it – it* = St+1-St . 
where   
it is domestic interest rate 
it*/ is foreign interest rate on similar asset ( identical in all respects except for 
yield and currency denomination)  
St is the spot exchange rate. 
A  risk  neutral  person  would  replace  St+1  by  his  expectation  about  future 
exchange rate. So we get  
it – it*  = E(St+1) – St 
Any deviation from UIP can be attributed to currency associated risks in the 
absence of hedging agreements- namely currency premium and expectation bias. 
 
b)   Covered  Interest  Parity-  Assume  that  individuals  are  risk  averse.  Such  an 
individual would like to cover himself for any unexpected currency fluctuation 
during  the  tenure  of  the  deal.  Given  the  forward  contract  market,  he  would 
purchase a forward contract and use the exchange rate mentioned in the contract. 
Then any difference in interest rate should be equated to forward premium. This 
is called CIP: 
 
it – it* = Ft- St 
or  
it – it* = ft 
where Ft is forward rate and ft is forward premium.     6 
Any  deviation  from  CIP  would  suggest  that  the  markets  are  inefficient, 
regulations  like  capital  controls  exist  and  costs  like  sovereign  risk,  individual 
borrowing constraints are not accounted for. 
3.2  Econometrics 
 
To test the basic relation of interest rate parity we can think of a linear regression of 
the following type: 
Equation 1: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆St  =  α α α α   + β β β β ( it – it*) + ε ε ε εt 
 
For Uncovered Interest Parity we would expect α to be 0 and β to be equal to 1. 
 
For covered interest parity we would use the following regression: 
Equation 2: ft  =  α α α α   + β β β β ( it – it*) + ε ε ε εt   
 
and then test for  β = 1. 
The problem with using Ordinary Least Square as an estimation technique 
relates  to  the  issue  of  non-stationarity  of  the  time  series  involved  in  the  above 
equation. In case of non-stationary times series the estimate of β would be spurious 
and  biased.  However  if  we  can  show  that  the  two  variables  in  question  are 
cointegrated than the OLS estimates are super consistent and would converge to their 
true  value  faster  (see).  Thus  before  drawing  inferences  based  on  the  results  of 
ordinary  least  squares  it  is  imperative  to  check  the  variables  namely  F  (3-month 
forward premium) and IDIFF (3-month TB auction rate differential between India and 
U.S). In case the two series are integrated of the same order we can then test for 
cointegartion between the two non-stationary variables. 
For covered interest parity we need to test for β = 1 where β is the coefficient 
of IDIFF. Formally, 
 
Ho: β = 1  - Covered Interest Rate Parity holds 
H1: β ≠ 1 – There is no interest rate convergence. 
 
The above test uses a standard t- statistic given by: 
t =  (β - 1)/σβ   ~  tn-2     7 
 
where  σβ  is estimated standard error of β. Under the null hypothesis the above 
statistic follows a t-distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom. 
 
3.3  Data  Sources 
 
The paper use the monthly data on following variables: 
1)  3-month TB Auction rate for India- Apr 1993 to Mar 2003- Source: RBI 
Bulletin. 
2)  3-month  Forward  Premia-Apr1993  to  Mar  2003-Source:  Handbook  of 
Statistics, RBI 
3)  6-month  Forward  Premia-Apr1993  to  Mar  2003-Source:  Handbook  of 
Statistics, RBI 
4)  Call Money Rate-Apr1993 to Mar 2002-Source: Handbook of Statistics, 
RBI 
5)  3-month  TB  Auction  rate  for  U.S.-  Apr  1993  to  Mar  2003-Source: 
http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/of/ofrespr.htm 
 
List of Variables used in the Analysis: 
Variable Name  Description 
IDIFF  3-month TB interest differential between India and U.S 
EDIFF  Change in Rs/Dollar Exchange Rate 
F  3-Month Forward Premium 
DCALL  Change in Call Money Rate 
Sign1  Dummy Variable, which assumes value 1 if DCALL is positive. 
Sign2  Dummy Variable, which assumes value 1 if DCALL is negative. 
 
The key variables involved in CIP are plotted in Fig 1.This suggests that the 
degree of integration was low till mid-1998 and has increased dramatically since then.     8 
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Note: *The sharp upward spikes represent RBI Interventions (short term tightening) in the 
financial market.     9 
 
4  RESULTS 
4.1  Stationarity and Co-integration 
Since we are using high frequency time series data it is necessary to test for 
stationarity of the variables involved in above regressions. In case of non-stationarity, 
we need to show that the variables of same order of integration are cointegrated. The 
results for unit root tests are summarised in Table 1 which shows that variables F and 
IDIFF are I (1) processes while DCALL is I(0). 
Table 1 : Unit Root Test Results 
Variable  Test 
Type  
Model Type






ADF  No Constant, No 
Trend 
-1.09  -1.95  Unit  Root  with  no  constant  and  no 
trend in the data 
 
IDIFF 
PP  No Constant, No 
Trend 
-1.17  -1.95  Unit  Root  with  no  constant  and  no 
trend in the data 
ADF  No Constant, No 
Trend 
-1.49  -1.95  Unit  Root  with  no  constant  and  no 
trend in the data 
 
F 
PP  No Constant, No 
Trend 
-1.97  -2.58*  Unit  Root  with  no  constant  and  no 
trend in the data 
*1% critical value 
ADF  No Constant, No 
Trend 
-2.09  -1.95  No Unit Root    
DCALL 
PP  Constant, No 
Trend 
-7.74  -2.86  No Unit Root  
Unit Root Tests in first differences of IDIFF and F 
ADF  Constant, No Trend  -3.46  -2.86  No Unit Root    
IDIFF  PP  Constant, Trend  -10.1  -3.41  No Unit Root  
ADF   Constant, No 
Trend 
-3.79  -2.86  No Unit Root    
F 
PP  Constant, Trend  -9.62  -3.41  No Unit Root  
     10 
After ascertaining that the variables are integrated of the same order, we select 
the order of the VAR. The AIC, SBC, and the likelihood ratio test collectively suggest 
an optimal lag length of 2. The next step is to test for Co-integration between IDIFF 
and F using Johansen’s procedures. Both the maximum and trace eigen value statistics 
strongly reject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration between the variables 
(i.e. r = 0), but do not reject the hypothesis that there is one cointegrating relation 
between the variables (i.e. r = 1) {Table 2}. Hence using least squares would yield 
super-consistent estimators. Note that DCALL is stationary and thus can be included 
as an exogenous policy variable in the interest parity equation.  
Table 2: Results of Johansen’s Co-integration Test 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
A) Co-integration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigen value of the 
Stochastic Matrix  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
118 observations from 1993 M6 to 2003 M3. Order of VAR = 2.                  
List of variables included in the co-integrating vector: F and 
IDIFF                                                         
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Null    Alternative    Statistic       90% Critical Value     Interpretation 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
r = 0      r = 1        13.5006            12.9800            Co-integration 
at 




B)Co-integration  LR  Test  Based  on  Trace  of  the  Stochastic 
Matrix        
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
118 observations from 1993M6  to 2003M3 . Order of VAR = 2.                  
List of variables included in the co-integrating vector: F and 
IDIFF                                                         
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Null   Alternative    Statistic      90% Critical Value       Interpretation 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
r = 0     r>= 1        18.6910           15.7500              Co-integration  
r<= 1     r = 2         5.1903            6.5000              at 10% 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.2  Covered Interest Parity 
Empirically,  one  finds  more  evidence  for  the  CIP,  which  equates  forward 
premium to the interest rate differential. For the period April 1993 to March 2003 we 
                                                                                                                                             
1   The choice of the model for conducting the unit root test is based on the sequential unit root testing 
procedure. See appendix for details.     11 
have  regressed  F  (3-montb  forward  premium)  on  IDIFF  (Differential  between  3-
month TB rate for India and U.S). The estimated equation is: 
 
Equation 3:  F =  2.0    +    0.93* IDIFF  




2 (adjusted) = 0.14, DW= 0.35. 
 
After adjusting for AR(1) the equation becomes: 
 
Equation 4: F =  3.0    +  0.65* IDIFF + 0.83*AR(1) 
(1.7)*    (2.0)**    (15.8)*** 
 R
2= 0.729, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.724, DW= 1.7. 
 
The coefficient of IDIFF in above equation is 0.65. The calculated absolute 
value of t for the hypothesis test is 1.09, which is less than the critical value 2.  So we 
can accept the Ho at 5% level of significance and conclude that CIP holds for the 
period under consideration.  This shows that short-term money markets (3-month) in 
India  are  getting  integrated  with  global  (US)  money  markets  even  though  the 
integration is far from perfect.  
We would have liked to test the hypothesis for 1-month, 6-month and 1 year 
treasury bills, but a completely consistent data set is not available.  In our view hybrid 
data sets do not provide a rigorous test (e.g. using 6 month forwards to test integration 
between one year securities).  
4.3  Un-covered Interest Parity 
The interest rate parity hypothesis postulates that with flexible exchange rates 
and  non-frictionless  capital  markets  the  difference  between  the  yield  on  identical 
assets in two countries could be explained by expected change in the exchange rate. 
Assuming perfect foresight we can test for uncovered interest rate parity by regressing 
change in spot exchange rate on interest rate differential and testing for the coefficient 
of interest rate differential being equal to 1. The estimated equation is as follows. 
Equation 5: EDIFF =  0.229    -    0.021* IDIFF 
                                                 
2   Terms in the brackets are t-ratios for respective parameter estimates. Significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level is represented by one, two and three stars respectively.     12 




2 (adjusted) = -0.021, DW = 1.56. 
The coefficient on interest rate differential is negative and close to 0.
4 Thus the 
UIP hypothesis fails in India.  Given that CIP has been shown to hold during the same 
time period, this implies that the exchange risk premium for the Indian rupee is not 
zero (i.e. it is positive).   
There have been a number of recognised external shocks during the nineties, 
such  as  the  Mexican  crisis  and  the  Asian  crises,  that  lead  to  heightened  external 
uncertainty  and  increased  foreign  exchange  risk  perception.    These  were  also 
situations in which the Central bank (RBI) intervened in the financial markets.  The 
next section analyses the outcome. 
4.4  Exchange Risk and RBI Intervention 
As per the declared policy of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), RBI intervenes 
to smooth out short term fluctuations in demand-supply balances arising from lumpy 
demand for foreign exchange (e.g. large repayment of debt) that it thinks will lead to 
excessive volatility given the thinness of the market. This intervention is commonly 
done  through  sale/purchase  of  foreign  exchange.  If  the  behaviour  of  the  RBI  is 
completely symmetric with zero sterilisation, we would expect symmetric effects on 
call  markets  (increased/reduced  liquidity)  and  on  forward  rates  (higher/lower 
reserves).  The higher the degree of sterilisation the less the effect of foreign inflow 
on liquidity  and more asymmetric the relationship between call rates and forward 
rates (i.e. rising call rates have larger co-efficient than falling ones). 
The RBI also intervenes to counter sharp adverse changes in expectations, like 
those arising from domestic and global political developments (e.g. post Pokharan 
sanctions, Kargil war) and external crisis such as the Mexican and Asian crisis.  This 
intervention is commonly done through short-term instruments (overnight and 7-day 
repos, bank rate/moral suasion of banks), and translates into sharp upward movement 
in the inter-bank call money market rates.  These in turn are reflected in a rise in 
foreign exchange forward rates.  It is only at the time of the next auction, however, 
that these developments get reflected in the T-bill auction rates.
5 Such tightening is 
                                                 
3   Terms in the brackets are t-ratios for respective parameter estimates 
4   Similar results are obtained after adjusting for auto regression (DW rises to 1.9 with AR). 
5   The secondary market rates on T-bills are available for too short a period to do statistically 
credible tests.     13 
generally followed in due course by a loosening to the starting position, but forwards 
may not revert to the original level given the residual uncertainty.  
In order to gauge the impact of policy changes on the interaction between 
forward rate and interest differential we have re-estimated the above equation in the 
following form: 
 
Ft  =  α   + β1 IDIFF + β2 * DCALL  + εt   
 
where  DCALL-  is  the  change  in  the  call  money  rate.    The  estimated  equation 
corresponding to Equation 4 is given by, 
Equation 6 : F = 3.7 + 0.58*IDIFF + 0.10*DCALL  + 0.84*AR(1) 
          (2.0)*  (1.8)*           (3.4)***              (15.8)*** 
R
2= 0.75, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.74, DW= 1.6. 
 
The estimated coefficient of the interest differential has now fallen from 0.65 
to 0.58. However, to see whether it is statistically different from 1 we would perform 
the t- test for the restriction β = 1 again. Under Ho of β = 1 the t-statistic mentioned in 
(iii) follows t-distribution with n-3 degrees of freedom. The calculated value for the 
test β = 1 is 1.28, which is less than the critical value so that the CIP hypothesis still 
holds. 
External shocks and  RBI  exchange  market stabilisation efforts through the 
short-term money market seem to loosen the link between the domestic and foreign 
money markets.   
 
5  CONCLUSIONS 
The paper shows that the short-term (up to 3 month) money markets in India 
are getting progressively integrated with those in the USA even though the degree of 
integration is far from perfect.  Covered interest parity is found to hold for while 
uncovered  interest  parity  fails  to  hold.    The  difference  between  the  two  can  be 
attributed to the existence of an exchange risk premium over and above the expected 
depreciation of the currency.  Analysis of RBI interventions in response to foreign 
exchange shocks suggests that these may play a role in the deviations from interest     14 
parity.  Further work needs to be done however on this as well as on instruments of 
other  maturity  such  as  1  month  and  6  month  (for  which  consistent  data  was  not 
available). 
     15 
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7  APPENDIX: TESTS 
7.1  Order of integration 
7.1.1  Sequential ADF Test for unit root 
 
Step 1: Estimate 
∆yt = a0 +a2 t + γ yt-1 + ∑βi∆yt-i+1 + ∈t 
Test-Ho : γ = 0 using ιι statistics 
If Ho is rejected, no need to proceed. Conclude that {Yt} is stationary. If Ho is 
not rejected it is necessary to determine whether too many deterministic regressors 
were included. First test for the significance of trend: 
Ho:a2=0 given γ = 0 use ιβι 
We may also gain additional information  by testing 
Ho: a2= γ = 0 use φ3 
If trend is significant the retest for the presence of a unit root (i.e. γ=0) using 
the standardized normal distribution. If the Ho is rejected proceed no further-conclude 
that yt 
is stationary otherwise it is non-stationary. 
If a2 is not significant move to step 2. 
Step 2:Estimate 
∆yt = a0 + γ yt-1 + ∑βi∆yt-i+1 + ∈t 
Test Ho: γ = 0 use ιµ 
If Ho is rejected, conclude that {yt} is stationary. If Ho is not rejected then test 
for the significance of drift a0: 
Ho: a0=0 given γ = 0 use ιαµ 
We may also gain additional information  by testing 
Ho: a0= γ = 0 use φ1 
If drift is significant the retest for the presence of a unit root (i.e. γ=0) using 
the standardized normal distribution. If the Ho is rejected proceed no further-conclude 
that yt 
is stationary otherwise it is non-stationary. 
If a0 is not significant move to step 3. 
Step 3:Estimate  
∆yt = γ yt-1 + ∑βi∆yt-i+1 + ∈t     18 
Test Ho: γ = 0 use ι 
If Ho is rejected, conclude that {yt} is stationary otherwise it is nonstationary. 
 
7.1.2  Phillips-Perron Test 
 
This test rests on very mild assumptions regarding the distribution of the errors 
and can be used even if there is serial correlation and hetroscedasticity. In the ADF 
tests we assumed that the errors are white noise i.e. they are statistically independent 
and have a constant variance. 
Consider yt=a0+a1yt-1+µt 
yt=b0 +b1yt-1+b2(t-T/2) +µt 
T-number of observations 
E (µt)=0 but there is no requirement that disturbance term is serially uncorrelated and 
homogeneous. 
This test develops the test statistics for testing the presence of unit root by 
assuming that yt can be generated under Ho by a random walk process. 
Ho: yt = yt-1 + µt 
The Phillips-Perron test statistics are the modifications of the DF statistics that 
take into account the less restrictive nature of the error process. Some useful test 
statistics are: 
Z(ta1): used to test Ho:a1=0 - use ιµ 
Z(tb1): used to test Ho: b1=0 -use ιι 
Z(φ3): used to test b1=0 and b2=0 -use φ3 
 
7.2  Test for Co-integration: Johansen’s Methodology 
 
Given a group of non-stationary series we may be interested in determining 
whether the series are co-integrated.  
Step 1: Test for the order of integration using the DF, ADF, PP tests 
 
Step 2:Selection of the appropriate lag length. The result of the test can be 
quite sensitive to the lag length 
The most common procedure is to estimate a VAR using undifferenced data. 
Then use lag length tests as in VAR:     19 
a)  AIC= T ln∑ + 2N 
Where N total number of parameters estimated in all equations 
∑- natural log of the determinant of the var-cov matrix of the residuals. 
b)  SBC= T ln∑+ N lnT 
c)  LR = (T-c)[ln∑r - ln∑u] 
where T-number of usable observations 
c= number of parameters in the unrestricted system 
ln∑i- natural log of determinant of ∑i                      i= u, r  
The above statistic follows χ
2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
restrictions imposed. 
Step  3:  Estimate  the  model  and  determine  the  number  of  cointegrating 
relationships.  If  you  have  k  endogenous  variables,  there  can  be  from  zero  to  k-1 
linearly independent cointegrating relations. There are two formal test for determining 
the number of cointegarting relationships: 
a)  Trace test : 
Qr = -T ∑ log(1-λi) for r =0,1…k-1 
where λi is the i-th largest eigenvalue. This statistic tests the Ho® against Ha (k).    
To determine the number of cointegrating relations r, subject to the assumptions 
made about the trends in the series, we can proceed sequentially from r = 0 to r = 
k-1 until we fail to reject. 
b)  Maximum Eigen Value test: 
Qmax= -T log (1-λr+1)= Qr-Qr+1 
This  statistic  is  used  to  test  the  Ho  of  r  co-integrating  relationships  against  r+1 
relations. 
 
7.3  Call Money Assymmetry 
If the behaviour of the RBI is completely symmetric with zero sterilisation, we 
would expect symmetric effects on call markets (increased/reduced liquidity) and on 
forward rates (higher/lower reserves).  The higher the degree of sterilisation the less 
the  effect  of  foreign  inflow  on  liquidity  and  more  asymmetric  the  relationship 
between call rates and forward rates (i.e. rising call rates have larger co-efficient than     20 
falling ones).  Historically there has been incomplete sterilisation and therefore we 
expect some asymmetry in the relationship between call money rates and forward 
rates, though these interventions are very short term and may not even appear in data 
of monthly frequency. 
RBI  tightening  is  generally  followed  in  due  course  by  a  loosening  to  the 
starting position, but forwards may not revert to the original level given the residual 
uncertainty.  Thus the absolute impact co-efficient relating call rates to forwards is 
likely to be larger on the upside than on the downside. As the time period of such 
intervention is of the order of a week and movements are quite sharp, such asymmetry 
can be observed in monthly data. 
Ft  =  α   + β1 IDIFF + β2 (Sign1*DCALL) + β3 (Sign2*DCALL)  + εt   
 
where DCALL- is the change in the call money rate and sign1 and sign2 are dummies 
that separate positive changes in call money rates from negative changes 
The estimated equation corresponding to Equation 3 is given by, 
F = 1.88 + 0.688*IDIFF + 0.654*(SIGN1*DCALL) – 0.454*(SIGN2*DCALL) 
     (2.3)***  (3.9)***        (6.3)***                                (-4.7)*** 
R
2= 0.44, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.42, DW= 0.61. 
The estimated coefficient of interest differential has now fallen from 0.93 to 
0.69. However, to see whether it is statistically different from 1 we would perform the 
t- test for the restriction β = 1 again. Under Ho of β = 1 the t-statistic mentioned in 
(iii) follows t-distribution with n-4 degrees of freedom. The calculated value for the 
test β = 1 is 1.78 which is less than the critical value so that we can accept the CIP 
hypothesis.    The  same  conclusion  follows  after  adjusting  for  the  auto  regressive 
nature of the error term. 
F  =  3.1  +  0.58*IDIFF  +  0.35*(SIGN1*DCALL)  –  0.11*(SIGN2*DCALL)  + 
0.83*AR(1) 
(1.9)*  (2.0)*             (5.9)***                                (-2.1)**            (15.2)*** 
R
2= 0.80, R
2 (adjusted) = 0.79, DW= 1.9. 
The calculated value for the test β = 1 is 1.40, which is less than the critical value so 
that we can accept the CIP hypothesis. 